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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In 1972, the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia 
invalidated Georgia’s death penalty statute, effectively imposing a 
national moratorium on capital punishment.1  Although the majority 
failed to agree on a singular rationale for halting the death penalty, 
Justice William Douglas’s concurrence characterized capital 
punishment in Georgia as “pregnant with discrimination.”2  Four years 
later, when the Court reinstated the death penalty pursuant to Gregg v. 
Georgia, the majority declared that the “concerns expressed in Furman 
that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious 
manner can be… best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated 
proceeding.” 3  Since Gregg, however, many social scientists and legal 
scholars have examined whether this procedure actually protects 
against the arbitrary enforcement of capital punishment.  This Article 
extends that line of inquiry, analyzing 1,068 first-degree murder 
convictions that occurred in Tennessee following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gregg. 
A sizable body of research has focused on the intersection of 
race and the death penalty.  Two scholars, Michael Songer and Isaac 
Unah, distill the importance of this work, noting that, “[i]n light of the 
exceptionality and the total irrevocability of death as a form of 
punishment, it is especially important that citizens and policy makers 
understand how [the death penalty is implemented].”4  Such research, 
they add, has implications for “the legitimacy of the justice system and 
the amount of public esteem citizens are willing to bestow upon 
                                                        
1
 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). 
2
 Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).  Justices Stewart (Id. at 306) and White (Id. at 
310) also authored concurrences that expressed concern about inconsistent 
application of the death penalty, while Justices Brennan (Id. at 258) and Marshall 
(Id. at 315)—though they joined the overall five-vote majority—characterized the 
death penalty as unconstitutional under any circumstances. 
3
 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).  Gregg highlighted the importance of Georgia’s statutory 
mandate that juries in capital cases decide guilt or innocence first, and then 
separately consider the matter of punishment.  Further, in order to impose a death 
sentence, juries were required to find that a homicide was accompanied by 
“aggravating” factors, and that those outweighed any potential “mitigating” factors. 
4
 Michal Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on 
Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S. CAR. L. 
REV. 161, 162 (2006). 
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judicial institutions”—largely because, one might submit, these 
concepts are premised on the notion of fairness.5 
Early research into the death penalty focused primarily on the 
race of defendants, ostensibly to determine whether Black defendants 
were more likely to receive the death penalty than others.  David 
Baldus and George Woodworth noted that “empirical evidence 
generally suggests that the United States death penalty system is no 
longer characterized by the systemic discrimination against Black 
defendants that existed in many states before Furman v. Georgia.”6  
Even so, since Gregg many studies have demonstrated that the race of 
a victim is actually more significant of a predictor for a defendant 
receiving a capital sentence. 
The shift in scholarly focus from race-of-defendant to race-of-
victim analysis has not diminished the overall importance of 
examining the relationship between race and the death penalty.  Thus, 
“[i]t is useful to focus on what race-of-defendant and race-of-victim 
discrimination have in common—that is, decision making based on 
irrelevant characteristics.”7  Indeed, “this common feature is the basis 
for the Supreme Court’s holding in McKleskey v. Kemp that both 
forms of discrimination violate the Fourteenth and Eighth 
Amendments.”8 
This Article builds upon these theoretical underpinnings by 
analyzing “death-eligible” murder convictions in Tennessee between 
1977 and 2007.  Its objective is providing the state’s first controlled 
analysis of the death penalty’s implementation.9  Specifically, this 
                                                        
5
 Id. 
6
 David Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of 
Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1412 (2004). 
7
 Id. at 1446. 
8
 Id. (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (noting that no proof of 
specific discrimination was found)). 
9
 In a previous study, Scheb & Wagers located percentage point differences in the 
application of capital punishment in Tennessee based upon the victim’s race, but 
their work did so without using any control variables.  See John M. Scheb II & 
Kristin Wagers, Racial Discrimination in the Death Penalty in Tennessee: An 
Empirical Assessment, 5 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 9 (2009).  These authors actually 
concluded their work with a suggestion for future research to generate a 
“multivariate model” of race and the death penalty in Tennessee. Id. at 25.  For 
similar percentage comparisons with more limited data, see John M. Scheb II, et al., 
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Article seeks to explain why death-eligible defendants did or did not 
receive the death penalty in Tennessee.  Its methodology generates 
variables that address the demographics of both offender and victim in 
each case, and considers the characteristics of each particular crime 
and the nature of available evidence.  This approach differs from 
similar research in other states by creating separate statistical models 
to explain both a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty and 
the jury’s decision to impose a death sentence, enabling a discussion 
on different agents’ motives in the process.   
This Article’s assessment of the death penalty begins by 
reviewing, in Section II, the sizable body of literature regarding capital 
punishment and race across all jurisdictions.  Section III describes 
statutory requirements for the death penalty in Tennessee, outlines the 
utilized data collection methods, and discusses the specific details of 
each variable considered.  A presentation of the statistical models 
follows in Section IV.  The Article concludes with a consideration of 
implications for notions of equality and fairness in the criminal justice 
system. 
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON RACE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
Early social science research located significant disparities in 
administration of the death penalty based on the race of defendants.10  
Specifically, “these studies determined that Blacks were indicted, 
charged, convicted, and sentenced to death in disproportionate 
numbers  . . .”11  However, these early works incurred criticism for 
failing to implement adequate statistical controls.12   
Later, Baldus et al. (1983) conducted what is still the most 
prominent of the modern, controlled studies regarding race and the 
                                                                                                                                   
Race, Prosecutors and Juries: The Death Penalty in Tennessee, 29 JUS. SYS. J. 338 
(2008). 
10
 See generally, Harold Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial 
Homicides, 27 SOC. FORCES  369 (1949); Elmer Johnson, Selective Factors in 
Capital Punishment, 6 SOC. FORCES 165 (1957); CHARLES MANGUM, THE LEGAL 
STATUS OF THE NEGRO (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1940). 
11
 WILLIAM BOWERS, ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 
1864-1982, 69-70 (Northeastern Press, 1984). 
12
 Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing:  A Critical Evaluation 
of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AMER. SOC. REV. 
783, 786-92 (1981). 
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death penalty.  In upholding the death penalty in McCleskey v. Kemp, 
the Supreme Court cited the work, which examined over 2,000 death 
penalty cases in Georgia from the 1973 to 1979.13  The Court noted 
that this study found that the race of the defendant was not relevant in 
death penalty decisions, but offered evidence that offenders who killed 
White victims were more likely to receive the death penalty, even after 
controlling for a litany of factors.14  Specifically, the study examined 
230 relevant variables including the nature of the crime, the location of 
the crime, and the characteristics of offender and victim, finding that a 
death sentence was 4.3 times more likely in death-eligible cases when 
the victim was White.15 
Since that study, a substantial body of literature has emerged 
around the question of race and capital punishment.  Oft-cited studies 
from the 1980s include the work of Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro,  
Michael Radelet and Glenn Pierce, and Raymond Pasternoster.  Gross 
and Mauro looked at eight states (Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Oklahoma, 
North Carolina, Mississippi, Virginia, and Arkansas), finding that the 
presence of a White victim was a significant predictor of a death 
sentence.16  Radelet and Pierce examined death-eligible cases in 
Florida from 1976-1987, noting that defendants were 3.4 times more 
likely to receive a death sentence for killing a White victim.17 
Pasternoster found that, in South Carolina from 1977-1981, capital 
charges were 9.6 times more likely when the victim was White.18   
Other studies from this time period arrived at a similar 
conclusion regarding the race of a victim.19  In 1990, the United States 
                                                        
13
 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-98.  
14
 Id. at 286. 
15
 David Baldus, et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences:  An Empirical 
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983). 
16
 SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 35 (Northeastern Press, 1989).  
17
 Michael Radelet & Glenn Pierce, Choosing Who Will Die: Race and the Death 
Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
18
 Raymond Pasternoster, Race of the Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to 
Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983).  
19
 Richard Lempert, Capital Punishment in the ‘80s: Reflections on the Symposium, 
74 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1101 (1983); Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Structured 
Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty:  The First Decade after Furman in 
Texas, 69 SOC. SCI. QUARTERLY 853 (1988); Michael Radelet & Glenn Pierce, Race 
and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 L. & SOC. REV. 587 (1985); 
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General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook an examination of this 
entire body of research and observed that, of twenty-eight previous 
studies of race and the death penalty, 82% located evidence that the 
victim’s race influenced the defendant’s likelihood of either being 
charged with capital murder by a prosecutor or being sentenced to 
death by a jury.20 
Subsequently, Baldus and Woodworth reviewed eighteen 
studies from 1990 to 2003, and again noted that the race of the 
defendant did not have a significant impact on likelihood of receiving 
a death sentence, but that the race of the victim did.21  At the time of 
their review, Baldus and Woodworth said that “reasonably well-
controlled studies” of race and the death penalty had been conducted 
in California, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and South 
Carolina.22  Another study from this era addressed San Francisco 
County.23  Encapsulating much of this time period’s research, one 
author concluded that “the death penalty is between three and four 
times more likely to be imposed in cases in which the victim is White 
rather than Black.”24 
More recently, within the last ten years, controlled studies have 
found that the race of the victim is a significant predictor of a death 
sentence in Maryland,25 Illinois,26 California,27 Colorado,28 and North 
                                                                                                                                   
Dwayne Smith, Patterns of Discrimination in Assessments of the Death Penalty:  
The Case of Louisiana, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 279 (1987).   
20
 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: 
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 1-2 (1990). 
21
 David Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty: 
An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 501, 517-19 (Carolina Academic Press, 2003). 
22
 Id. 
23
 Robert Weiss, et al., Assessing the Capriciousness of Death Penalty Charging, 30 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 607 (1996).  
24
 Michael Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The Changing Nature of Death Penalty 
Debates, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 47 (2000). 
25
 Raymond Pasternoster, et al. Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration 
of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 MARGINS L. J. 1 (2004). 
26
 Glenn Pierce & Michael Radelet, Race, Region and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 
1988-1997, 81 ORE. L. REV. 39 (2002). 
27
 Glenn Pierce & Michael Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on 
Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2005). 
28
 Stephanie Hindson, et al., Race, Gender, Region and Death Sentencing in 
Colorado, 1980-1999, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 549 (2006). 
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Carolina.29  However, in Nebraska, the Baldus and Woodworth study 
uncovered no evidence of a race-of-victim effect; understandably so, 
as the cases that were more likely to advance to the death penalty 
phase arose in urban geographic regions that were more populated 
with minorities.30    
Another study recognized that a potential mechanism 
underlying these findings could be that “the jury system explicitly 
brings community sentiments into the judicial decision-making 
process.”31  More specifically, it stated that, “jury members have 
difficulty replacing their socially conditioned views of victims and 
offenders with strict legal considerations, especially for the crimes 
they find most shocking and abhorrent.”32  In Turner v. Murray, 
Justice Byron White actually addressed this matter by noting that “the 
range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing . . 
. [creates] a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate 
undetected.”33   
A subset of death penalty literature ventured beyond the jury’s 
deliberations to focus more narrowly on a prosecutor’s decision to 
seek the death penalty in a death-eligible case.  Songer and Unah 
delineated the potential for abuse in this part of the capital punishment 
phase when they said, “Prosecutors exercise broad discretion within a 
porous network of rules when deciding which murder cases merit 
capital punishment and which do not.”34  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Bass highlighted the breadth of this 
discretion as it pertains to capital punishment decisions.35   
Of course, the inherent ‘check’ on prosecutors’ discretion—
their responsibilities to their constituencies as elected officials—can 
also be a drawback.  After all, the biases ingrained in public perception 
                                                        
29
 Michael Radelet & Glenn Pierce, Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 
1980-2007, 89 N. CAR. L. REV. 2119 (2011). 
30
 David Baldus, et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the 
Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973–
1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002). 
31
 Bowers et al., supra note 11, at 69.  
32
 Id. at 339. 
33
 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986). 
34
 Songer & Unah, supra note 4, at 162. 
35
 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (denying the defendant’s motion for discovery to explore the 
prosecutor’s allegedly selective capital charging practices). 
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may influence a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty, accept 
a guilty plea for a lesser sentence, or agree to a plea bargain in 
exchange for testimony against another defendant.36  In particular, 
Bowers et al. found that prosecutors are more likely to seek the death 
penalty in response to negative sentiments and reaction to crime37 or 
“pressure from the police.”38  These outside influences heighten the 
potential for extra-legal factors, like race, to enter into prosecutors’ 
charging decision.  Overall, as Harvard Law Professor Randall 
Kennedy noted, prosecutorial discretion is “the most significant factor 
that affects the far-flung and subtle racial selectivity that infects the 
death penalty system.”39 
Two studies conducted early empirical research on the matter 
of prosecutorial discretion in seeking the death penalty in New Jersey40 
and Kentucky;41 both studies found that the race of a victim was a 
significant factor in explaining prosecutors’ decisions to pursue a 
death sentence.  More recently, researchers noticed similar effects in 
New Mexico;42 Colorado;43 South Carolina;44 Durham, North 
Carolina;45 East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana;46 Arkansas;47 and 
Harris County, Texas.48  However, Klein et al. uncovered no clear 
                                                        
36Bowers et al., supra note 11, at 339.  
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. at 345. 
39
 Isaac Unah, Choosing Those Who Will Die: The Effect of Race, Gender, and Law 
In Prosecutorial Decisions To Seek the Death Penalty in Durham County, North 
Carolina, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 135, 161-62 (2009). 
40
 Lee Bienna, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 158 (1988). 
41
 Gennaro Vito & Thomas Keil, Capital Sentencing in Kentucky:  An Analysis of the 
Factors Influencing Decision Making in the Post-Gregg Period, 79 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 301 (1988); for updated research, see Thomas Keil & Gennaro Vito, 
Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: 1976-1991, 20 AM J. CRIM. 
L. 17 (1995). 
42
 Marcia J. Wilson, The Application of the Death Penalty in New Mexico, July 1979 
through December 2007: An Empirical Analysis, 38 NEW MEX. L. REV. 255 (2008). 
43
 Hindson et al., supra note 28. 
44
 Songer & Unah, supra note 4. 
45
 Unah, supra note 39. 
46
 Glenn Pierce & Michael Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish, 
1990-2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
47
 David Baldus, et al., Evidence of Racial Discrimination in the Use of the Death 
Penalty: A Story From Southwest Arkansas with Special Reference to the Case of 
Death Row Inmate Frank Williams, Jr., 76 TENN. L. REV. 555 (2009). 
48
 Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. 
L. REV. 807 (2008).  
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race-of-victim effect in federal prosecutors’ decisions to seek a 
sentence of death.49   
Pierce and Radelet posit that the reason for such statistically 
significant findings may be “that prosecutor’s offices, jurors, judges, 
investigating police officers, and others involved in constructing a 
death penalty case are (consciously or unconsciously) not as outraged 
or energized, on average, when a Black is murdered as when a White 
is murdered.”50  They add that “death penalty cases are expensive, and 
choices need to be made on how often the death penalty can be 
sought,” observing that, “as a method to help victims, [the death 
penalty requires that] prosecutors and other decision makers have to 
arrange families of homicide victims on a vertical hierarchy, making 
decisions about which is most ‘deserving’ of a death sentence.”51  
Linking this “hierarchy” to actual legal considerations, Baldus et al. 
submit that racial prejudice could inflate a prosecutor’s interpretation 
of “aggravation,” and decrease perception of “mitigation.”52   
III. RELEVANT STATUTES, DATA AND METHODS 
A. Statutory Guidelines for the Death Penalty in Tennessee 
Most relevant to the ensuing discussion is the Tennessee statute 
that defines the elements of first-degree murder, the only death 
penalty-eligible indictment in Tennessee.53  Tennessee Code 
Annotated § 39-13-202(a) defines first-degree murder as: 
(1) A premeditated and intentional killing of another; (2) 
A killing of another committed in the perpetration of or 
attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, act of 
terrorism, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, 
kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child 
neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child or 
                                                        
49
 Stephen Klein et al., Race and the Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Federal 
Cases, (National Institute of Justice, research report, 2006), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR389.p
df (accessed May 1, 2013). 
50
 Pierce & Radelet, supra note 46, at 671 n. 54. 
51
 Id. at 673 n. 54. 
52
 Baldus et al., supra note 47, at 566-67. 
53
 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(c) (2007). 
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aircraft piracy; or (3) A killing of another committed as 
the result of the unlawful throwing, placing or 
discharging of a destructive device or bomb. 54 
The State of Tennessee can punish anyone convicted of first-
degree murder “by (1) death; (2) imprisonment for life without the 
possibility of parole; or (3) imprisonment for life.55  At least one of the 
statutory aggravating factors must be present in order to apply the 
death penalty.56  In other words, to be eligible for the death penalty, a 
defendant must be convicted of first-degree murder, and a jury must 
find that at least one aggravating factor exists in order to impose a 
death sentence.  Appendix A describes Tennessee’s statutory 
aggravating factors.57  
B. Data Source 
Herein, this Article compiles data on first-degree murder 
convictions (n=1068) rendered by Tennessee criminal and circuit 
courts over three decades (1977 to 2007, inclusive).  The data derives 
from evaluations submitted pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court 
Rule 12, which mandates the completion of detailed reports on first-
degree murder convictions.58  In all cases resulting in a first-degree 
murder conviction dating from 1976, irrespective of the sentence, 
Tennessee trial judges must complete parts of the Rule 12 form for 
each convicted defendant.59  Prosecutors and defense attorneys must 
also complete certain sections of the Rule 12 form.60  The Rule 12 
form contains various facts about the criminal case and background 
information on both the defendant and victim(s).61  It is unclear what 
total percentage of first-degree murder convictions from this time 
period was actually included in the database, but nothing indicates that 
large numbers of cases are missing. 
                                                        
54
 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a) (2007). 
55
 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(c) (2007). 
56
  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(g) (2011). 
57
 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i) (2011). 
58
 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 12.1. 
59
 Id, 
60
 Id. 
61
 See id. 
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Therefore, this Article analyzes all defendants indicted and 
convicted of first-degree murder in the state of Tennessee from 1976 
to 2007 upon which a Rule 12 report exists, regardless of sentencing 
outcome.  According to the database, there were 1,068 first-degree 
murder convictions in Tennessee during this 30-year time frame.  Of 
these 1,068 cases, prosecutors served notice to seek the death penalty 
in 361 (33.8%) cases and the court imposed the death penalty in 160 
(44.3%) of the 361 cases.  Further, of the 1,068 first-degree murder 
convictions, 994 involved male defendants and 74 involved female 
defendants.  Additionally, 538 defendants were White and 480 
defendants were Black.  Although this Article focuses exclusively on 
the dynamics between Blacks and Whites, there were fourteen 
Hispanic defendants, seven Asian defendants, one Native American 
defendant, two defendants classified as “Other,” and twenty-six 
defendants whose race was unknown.  Of the victims, 642 were White 
and 337 were Black.  There were eight Hispanic victims, seven Asian 
victims, two Native American victims, seven victims classified as 
“Other,” and sixty-five victims whose race was unknown.  Lastly, 729 
victims are male and 393 are female.   
C. Statistical Methods and Hypotheses 
The best way to analyze the impact of race on the behavior of 
prosecutors and juries is to develop a multivariate logistic regression 
model that incorporates various control variables.  This is the 
statistical methodology used in the majority of studies referenced 
herein.  Early works regarding capital punishment and race highlighted 
the need for such controls,62 and more recent studies have differed 
only in their focus on selecting the appropriate variables (as this 
Article will discuss below).  Along these lines, Baldus and Woodworth 
define “well-controlled” as incorporating “adjustment for 15 or more 
controls.”63 
This Article presents two logistic regression models that utilize 
twenty-three independent variables.  First, using all cases in the 
                                                        
62
 Alfred B. Heilbrun, Jr., et al., The Death Sentence in Georgia, 1974-1987: 
Criminal Justice or Racial Injustice?, 16 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 139, 141 (1989); 
Stephen Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim Race to Death 
Penalty Sentences in California, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 33, 35 (1991). 
63
 Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 6, at 1495 n. 22. 
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dataset, the initial model explains the prosecutor’s decision to seek the 
death penalty.  It codes the dependent variable, the prosecutor’s 
decision to seek capital punishment, as ‘1’ when the prosecutor seeks 
the death penalty, and as ‘0’ otherwise.  Missing data on the control 
variables for the regression models render the sample size for this 
model at n=1006.   
The next model, using only those cases in which the prosecutor 
sought the death penalty (n=337),  explains jury decisions to impose 
the death penalty, coding the dependent variable, the jury’s decision to 
recommend capital punishment,  as ‘1’ when a jury sentences a 
defendant to death and as ‘0’ otherwise.  Again, since the dependent 
variables in these models are dichotomous, they utilize logistic 
regression. 
This Article’s primary hypotheses relate to the race of the 
victim, and are as follows: 
Hypothesis #1: Prosecutors will be more likely to seek the death 
penalty when the victim of a death-eligible homicide is White. 
Hypothesis #2: The likelihood of a jury imposing a death sentence for 
a death-eligible homicide will be greater when the victim is White. 
D. Independent Variables 
In keeping with the previously discussed literature, the central 
independent variables of this Article’s analysis are the race of the 
defendant, labeled Black Defendant, and the race of the victim, 
labeled White Victim.  As noted earlier, based on prior studies, this 
Article advances that the race of the defendant will not be a relevant 
consideration.  This Article includes twenty-one other control 
variables drawn from previous literature.  For clarity, those variables 
fit into four categories: 1) Characteristics of the Homicide; 2) 
Evidence Against the Defendant; 3) Victim Traits; 4) Defendant 
Traits. 
1. Independent Variables, Category 1: Characteristics of the 
Homicide 
The intuitive starting points for this analysis are the variables 
that assess the nature of the homicide.  Justice Stevens thought, at least 
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until recently,64 that an infrequently administered death penalty, 
limited to only the most heinous of murders, could be purged of racial 
discrimination.65  Dissenting in McCleskey v. Kemp, Justice Stevens 
observed that: 
“. . . there exist certain categories of extremely 
serious crimes for which prosecutors 
consistently seek, and juries consistently 
impose, the death penalty without regard to the 
race of the victim or the race of the offender. If 
[the State] were to narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants to those categories, the 
danger of arbitrary and discriminatory 
imposition of the death penalty would be 
significantly decreased, if not eradicated.”66 
The key, though, is to determine how to control for “extremely serious 
crimes,” because as Cheatwood recognizes, so-called “lesser” 
homicides—“where the crime is not as brutal or as heinous”—ripen 
the opportunity for “racism [to come] into play.”67  This Article 
accounts for the possibility that different types of homicides may be 
treated differently by prosecutors and juries by including the following 
dichotomous control variables: 
Three or More Victims. The regression models code the killing 
of three or more victims within the same crime spree or within a 48 
month period as ‘1.’  As Baldus et al. say, “additional deaths amplify 
culpability... [and] are so egregious that they should have comparably 
harsh procedural outcomes….”68  Previous literature has controlled for 
the number of victims and found that the likelihood of a death sentence 
increases with that number, including the work of Pierce and 
Radelet,69 Radelet and Pierce,70 Baldus et al.,71 Unah,72 Phillips,73 and 
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 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71-87 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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68
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 Radelet & Pierce, supra note 29, at 2139-40 n. 106-07. 
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Weiss et al.74  This Article focuses on three or more victims because 
that is a statutory aggravating factor for the death penalty in the state 
of Tennessee; specifically, the statute references three victims in a 
“single episode” or in a 48 month period, and the coding of this 
variable corresponds (see Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-204(i) in 
Appendix A). 
Dangerous Concurrent Crime. The models code homicide 
accompanied by arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, 
child abuse, or a bombing as ‘1.’  Each of these categories occur 
separately in the Rule 12 database, but this Article collapses them into 
a single variable, coding the presence of just one of the crimes as ‘1,’ 
and the absence of all as ‘0.’  Phillips, in contrast, accounts for the 
presence of additional felonies by listing them individually as separate 
controls in a regression model.75  This approach is unnecessary for the 
interests of this Article, as there is little to separate such felonies in 
terms of their perceived levels of depravity.  Pierce and Radelet’s 
research in North Carolina incorporates a slightly different approach, 
employing a “count” variable to find that the total number of 
additional felonies increases the likelihood of a death sentence.76  
However, the use of a single dichotomous variable in this Article’s 
regression models comports with the work of Weiss et al.77 and 
Radelet and Pierce in East Baton Rouge.78  Kremling et al. discuss 
differences between “count” and dichotomous variables that account 
for felonies in a regression model, and imply that the presence of a 
felony is likely to increase the probability of a death sentence 
regardless of exactly how a regression model captures these additional 
crimes.79  Hence, this Article uses the dichotomous approach to relay 
more parsimonious results. 
  Rape. This Article’s analysis does, however, create a separate 
category for rape.  The regression models code homicide accompanied 
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 Unah, supra note 39, at 143 (citing fn. 35). 
73
 Phillips, supra note 48, at 824. 
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 Weiss et al., supra note 23, at 623. 
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 Phillips, supra note 48, at 820.  
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 Pierce & Radelet, supra note 46, at 664.  
77
 Weiss et al., supra note 23, at 623. 
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 Radelet & Pierce, supra note 29, at 2139. 
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 Janine Kremling, et al. The Role of Mitigating Factors in Capital Sentencing 
Before and After McKoy v. North Carolina, 24 JUST. Q. 357, 363 (2007). 
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by rape as ‘1.’  Songer and Unah,80 Unah,81 Phillips,82 and Williams et 
al.83 all highlight the need to consider this matter as a separate control 
in order to isolate the murders most likely to be-perceived as heinous. 
This Article proposes that homicides accompanied by rape will be 
more likely to result in a capital charge from a prosecutor and an 
overall death sentence from a jury. 
Abnormal Method of Killing. The models code unusual 
methods of killing, which include stabbing, throat-slashing, drowning, 
beating, strangling/suffocating, poisoning, burning, pushing off high 
building, or hitting the victim with a vehicle, as ‘1.’  Most literature, 
with the exception of the likes of Phillips, has not extensively analyzed 
method of killing.84  This Article posits that an atypical technique may 
be perceived as more heinous, and thus may be more likely to lead to a 
death sentence.   
Three or More Co-Perpetrators. The models code homicides 
involving four or more total perpetrators as ‘1.’  The models include 
this variable to account for the perception that a group killing might be 
more heinous, and to account for gang-related killings, as suggested by 
Caldwell and Fisher-Ogden.85  This Article submits that multiple 
perpetrator offenses may be more likely to result in the death penalty 
because of a perception that gang activity is involved.  Although gang 
activity is not defined as a statutory aggravating factor in Tennessee, in 
2011, the state’s House Bill 870 proposed “murder as the result of 
gang activity as an aggravating factor for purposes of death penalty 
sentencing;” while that bill did not advance out of subcommittee 
deliberations, this Article assesses the relevance of its underpinnings.86  
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 Songer & Unah, supra note 4, at 192.  
81
 Unah, supra note 39, at 160-61. 
82
 Phillips, supra note 48, at 820. 
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Urban. The models code homicides as ‘1’ if they occur in any 
of the four Tennessee counties containing the state’s largest cities: 
Knox County (Knoxville), Davidson County (Nashville), Shelby 
County (Memphis), and Hamilton County (Chattanooga).  Pasternoster 
et al. note that death penalty studies should control for potential 
jurisdictional differences, as “any attempt to deal with any racial 
disparity in the imposition of the death penalty… cannot ignore the 
substantial variability that exists in different state’s attorneys’ offices 
in the processing of death cases.”87  More specifically, Pierce and 
Radelet offer two separate articles that control for differences between 
urban and rural jurisdictions; their studies from Illinois88 and from 
California89 both observe that rural jurisdictions are more likely to 
impose capital punishment for similar offenses.  It could be the case, 
then, that individuals from certain geographic regions may be more 
likely to characterize murders as heinous. 
2. Independent Variables, Category 2: Evidence Against the 
Defendant 
This Article also includes a set of control variables that much 
of the previous literature has failed to address: the nature of the 
evidence against a defendant.  Pierce and Radelet note that the race-of-
victim element “might correlate with the amount of resources that law 
enforcement devotes to gathering evidence.”90  Berk et al. control for 
defendant statements, eyewitness testimony and informant testimony 
in their study of race and the death penalty.91  This Article’s regression 
models code as ‘1’ the following variables: 
Strong Witness ID, or an identification of the defendant by 
either a police officer or a Rule 12 “familiar person;” the defendant’s 
Confession; Scientific Evidence linking the defendant to the 
homicide; or Co-Perpetrator Testimony.  This Article hypothesizes 
that these factors make prosecutors’ capital charges and juries’ death 
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sentences more likely by reducing the uncertainty involved in 
determining a verdict and by mollifying the concerns of a potentially 
unjust outcome. 
3. Independent Variables, Category 3: Victim Traits 
Victim traits are the third set of variables whose relationship to 
the death penalty this Article considers. 
White Victim. A White victim is, to reiterate, the primary 
independent variable drawn from the literature; the regression models 
code White victims as ‘1’ and all others as ‘0.’  This Article submits 
that homicides involving White victims will be more likely to result in 
a prosecutor’s charge of a capital offense and will also be more likely 
to result in a death sentence from a jury, as discussed in the literature 
review. 
Female Victim. The models code female victims as ‘1.’  Unah 
notes that, “White females are perceived as a subgroup deserving of 
special protection and this has often led to differential responses to 
their victimization.”92  Williams et al. also observe that “several 
studies find that cases with female victims are more likely to receive a 
death sentence than cases with male victims.”93  Further, Williams et 
al.’s own research finds that the victim’s gender is more relevant to 
juries than to prosecutors, a division that this Article’s split models 
will reconsider.94 
Killing of Law Agent.  The models code victims who were 
police officers, District Attorneys, or judges as ‘1.’  Cheatwood’s 
research suggests that such offenses against law enforcement agents 
are likely to be perceived as more heinous by both prosecutors and 
juries.95 
Stranger Victim. The models code victims with whom the 
defendants were unacquainted as ‘1.’  The literature differs on this 
matter, as Songer and Unah find that “stranger homicide” is more 
likely to result in a death sentence than other homicides,96 Weiss et al. 
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 Unah, supra note 39, at 160. 
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 Williams et al., supra note 83, at 870. 
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 Id. at 884. 
95
 Cheatwood, supra note 69, at 863. 
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find that when the victim is a friend or acquaintance, a death sentence 
is more likely,97 and Berk et al. find no significant effect for the 
variable.98  Accordingly, this Article reassesses these contradictory 
findings, considering the possibility that killing certain classes of 
individuals more likely will invoke outrage from both prosecutors and 
juries.  This Article also codes for the following classes of victims 
examined by Songer and Unah99: Elderly Victims, or victims over the 
age of seventy years old; and Child Victims, or victims under the age 
of twelve years old.  These criteria both constitute statutory 
aggravating factors in the state of Tennessee, as well.100 
4. Independent Variables, Category 4: Defendant Traits 
Finally, this Article analyzes specific traits of the individual 
accused of the homicide. 
Previous Violent Felony. The models code defendants with 
previous convictions for a violent felony as ‘1.’  Phillips notes that a 
violent criminal history can impact likelihood of a death sentence,101 
as do Weiss et al.102 and Baldus et al.103  Pierce and Radelet also state 
that “the defendant’s prior criminal history [is] generally considered to 
be an important factor in the imposition of the death penalty,” with a 
criminal history increasing the likelihood of a death sentence.104   
Male Defendant. The models code male defendants as ‘1.’  
Streib offers a study of cases from 1900 to 2005 and finds that females 
are less likely to face the death penalty than males.105  In discussing 
Streib’s work, Songer and Unah say, “[e]mpirical evidence suggests 
widespread reluctance on the part of prosecutors, judges and juries to 
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sentence female offenders to death.”106  Hindson et al. also find that 
prosecutors seek the death penalty more often against males.107 
Defendant Unemployed. The models code defendants who 
were unemployed at the time of arrest as ‘1.’  This variable accounts 
for the defendant’s socioeconomic status.  Cheatwood observes that 
there is little research on the relationship between that factor and the 
death penalty, highlighting the lack of data regarding offender 
economic status.  Cheatwood adds, though, that “because it is so 
difficult to establish reliable data to measure the wealth or poverty 
level of an offender, one of the few (and by default one of the best) 
measures we have is occupation.”108  Cheatwood uses a limited sample 
of raw data regarding occupation to note that, of those executed in 
Chicago from 1870 to 1930, “few, if any of them, were rich.”109  In 
this regard, Bright suggests that the lack of private counsel may be 
related to the level of poverty found on death row; he specifically 
states that “a large part of the death row population is made up of 
people who are distinguished by neither their records nor the 
circumstances of their crimes, but by their abject poverty… and the 
poor legal representation they received.”110  For these reasons, the 
models control for an accused’s employment status, based on the 
assumption that the unemployed will be less likely to afford private 
counsel, and thus could be disadvantaged at trial. 
Finally, although Tennessee statutes do not specifically define 
mitigating factors, this Article identifies three potential considerations 
that appear in the Rule 12 database: Showed Remorse, Learning 
Disability, and Potential for Rehabilitation.  Because the Rule 12 
database presents information on the presence or absence of these 
factors, this Article considers each matter separately as a dummy 
variable for which ‘1’ indicates presence and ‘0’ indicates absence.  
Any of these three factors could adversely affect the likelihood of a 
capital sentence.  In a study of capital juror’s receptiveness to 
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considering “mitigating circumstances,” however, Brewer finds that 
“the more heinous a crime was perceived to be,” the less likely a juror 
was to consider mitigating information.111  In addition, Kremling et al. 
observe that “accepted” mitigating factors are not as significant in 
explaining death penalty decisions as “accepted” aggravating factors; 
nevertheless, they do find that “accepted” mitigating factors will, 
ceteris paribus, slightly decrease the likelihood of a death sentence.112  
Before employing a logistic regression analysis with this array of 
independent variables, this Article will offer some descriptive statistics 
regarding race and the death penalty in Tennessee from 1977 to 2007. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Summary Statistics for First-Degree Murder Convictions 
An initial examination of contingency tables, or cross-
tabulations of this Article’s relevant data, reveals that Tennessee 
prosecutors sought the death penalty in 34% of the 1,068 cases.  In 
those 361 capital trials, juries returned death sentences 44% of the time 
(160 cases).  Thus, 15% of the first-degree murder convictions studied 
resulted in sentences of death.  From a demographic standpoint, 50% 
of the defendants convicted of first-degree murder were White; 45% 
were Black.113  Contrary to suppositions in early research, prosecutors 
were actually more likely to seek the death penalty against White 
defendants, and juries were more likely to return death sentences in 
cases involving White defendants (see Table 1 below).  As a result, 
19% of White defendants received the death penalty, compared with 
11% of African-American defendants. 
The results  differ somewhat, though, when it comes to the race 
of the murder victims.  As Table 1 shows, prosecutors were more 
likely to seek the death penalty in cases where the victims were White.  
Although juries were only slightly more likely to return death 
sentences in these cases, the result was that 18% of defendants who 
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killed White victims were sentenced to death, while only 10% of 
defendants whose victims were Black received the death penalty.   
Table 1: Racial Classification of Defendants and Victims 
 
 
% of All 
First-Degree 
Murder 
Convictions 
in Database 
% of Cases 
in which 
Prosecutor 
Sought 
Death 
Penalty 
% of Death 
Penalty 
Cases in 
which  Jury 
Returned  
Death 
Sentence 
% of Cases 
Resulting in 
Death 
Sentence 
     
White defendant 50.4% 38.5% 48.8% 18.8% 
Black defendant 44.9% 28.1% 37.8% 10.6% 
     
White victim 64.0% 39.4% 44.7% 17.6% 
Black victim 33.0% 23.1% 41.0% 9.5% 
     
White 
defendant/White 
victim 52.4% 39.4% 51.8% 19.0% 
White 
defendant/Black 
victim 2.0% 21.1% 50.0% 10.5% 
Black 
defendant/Black 
victim 32.7% 23.2% 41.1% 9.5% 
Black 
defendant/White 
victim 12.9% 37.9% 29.8% 11.3% 
 
While other researchers who intersected the race of defendants 
with that of victims found that Black defendants accused of killing 
White victims were more likely to be sentenced to death than any other 
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racial combination,114 the cross-tabs do not support the notion that 
Black defendant-White victim cases are more likely to result in either a 
capital charge or a death sentence.  To more thoroughly address this 
matter and the primary hypotheses, this Article turns to the logistic 
regression models.   
B. Model of Prosecutor Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty 
The next step is to determine whether the disparity with respect 
to the race of the victim holds when controlling for other variables that 
impact prosecutorial and jury behavior.  This Article achieves that 
objective by building the two aforementioned logistic regression 
models, each with the same collection of independent variables.  As 
mentioned, the first model, depicted in Table 2, focuses on the 
prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty.  Coding for the 
dependent variable in this model is ‘1’ when the prosecutor seeks a 
death sentence.  Here, a number of variables are significant predictors 
of that decision.  To simplify the discussion of these variables, this 
section explores the “odds ratio” analysis for those that achieve 
statistical significance, in order to demonstrate the impact that a 
particular factor has on a prosecutor’s decision to seek a death 
sentence.     
The first conclusion that can be drawn is that a prosecutor is 
more likely to seek a death sentence when the victim is White, 
rejecting the null for Hypothesis #1.  More specifically, the odds ratio 
shows that Tennessee prosecutors are approximately twice as likely to 
seek a capital charge when the victim is White.  Additionally, if the 
victim is female, prosecutors are 1.5 times more likely to charge it as a 
capital case.  It appears that the presence of a certain class of victims 
motivates the decision to seek a death sentence.  Other statistically 
relevant factors related to the victim include the following: the murder 
of an elderly victim (2.78 times more likely to seek), the murder of a 
victim who is a police officer, judge or District Attorney (15.87 times 
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more likely to seek), the murder of a victim who is a stranger to the 
defendant (1.5 times more likely to seek), and the murder of three or 
more victims (5.21 times more likely to seek).  Each of these factors 
establish a perception that certain murders are more heinous than 
others, and therefore are more deserving of capital punishment.   
 For control variables relating to the crime itself, the model 
shows that a murder accompanied by a rape is also more likely to 
result in a prosecutor charging a capital offense (2.72 times more 
likely to seek), as is a murder involving three or more perpetrators 
(1.77 times more likely); again, the perceived level of depravity 
associated with a homicide seems to be greater in these situations.  
Further, prosecutors are 9.37 times more likely to file capital charges 
when the defendant has a 
Table 2: Model of Prosecutor Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty 
in Tennessee, 1977-2007 
(Binary Logistic Regression) 
Dependent Variable = Prosecutor Sought Death Penalty (“1”) 
 
Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
Odds 
Ratio 
Victim Traits    
White Victim .7188*** .234 2.05 
Female Victim .4374*** .171 1.55 
Killing of Law Agent@ 2.765** 1.1282 15.87 
Victim Stranger .4058** .184 1.50 
Elderly Victim 1.023*** .259 2.78 
Child Victim .3429 .322 1.41 
Defendant Traits    
Black Defendant -.1179 .223 .889 
Male Defendant .3977 .349 1.49 
Defendant Unemployed -.2213 .193 .801 
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Previous Violent Felony 
Conviction 
2.237*** .252 9.37 
Potential for Rehabilitation .4818 .809 1.62 
Showed Remorse -.5258 .526 .591 
Learning Disability -.1259 .503 .882 
Crime Traits    
Urban County .0621 .174 1.06 
Three or More Victims 1.651*** .465 5.21 
Three or More Perpetrators .5696** .288 1.77 
Abnormal Method of Killing# .0732 .173 1.08 
Dangerous Concurrent Crime^ -.0017 .178 .998 
Rape .9993*** .368 2.72 
Evidence    
Co-Perpetrator Testimony .5633** .263 1.76 
Strong Witness ID .5228 .341 1.69 
Confession .5866** .253 1.80 
Scientific Evidence .6438* .361 1.90 
CONSTANT -2.579 .422  
Number of Cases 1006   
Variance Inflation Factor 1.84   
Percent Correctly Classified 76.04%   
Percent Classified A Priori 66.51%   
LR Chi-Square 258.49***   
Pseudo R Square .202   
 
 
# = stabbing, throat-slashing, drowning, beating, strangle/suffocate, poisoning, 
burning, pushing off high building, or hitting with a vehicle 
@= victim was police officer, District Attorney, or judge  
^ = arson, robbery, burglary, kidnap, aircraft piracy, child abuse, or bombing 
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*= p<.10; **= p<.05; ***= p<.01; two-tailed test 
 
previous violent felony conviction.  This finding may indicate the type 
of defendant that prosecutors are likely to target.  In that regard, there 
is no evidence that prosecutors in the state of Tennessee target Black 
defendants with capital charges more than White defendants; 
therefore, there is no race-of-defendant effect. 
Beyond that, important to the analysis is whether the defendant 
confessed (1.8 times more likely to seek), whether there was scientific 
evidence linking the defendant to the crime (1.9 times more likely to 
seek), and whether a co-perpetrator was going to testify (1.76 times 
more likely to seek).  These findings may suggest that prosecutors are 
more comfortable seeking a capital sentence when they have a 
heightened sense of certainty regarding the defendant’s guilt, or when 
they are more comfortable that the jury will be convinced of such guilt 
through the quality of evidence presented.     
C. Model of Jury Decisions to Impose a Death Sentence 
The jury model, depicted in Table 3, uses a dependent variable 
that captures whether the defendant received the death penalty, with 
‘1’ indicating a death sentence from a jury.  Table 3 focuses 
exclusively on the behavior of juries; as a result, its model only 
considers 337 cases in which the prosecutor sought the death 
penalty.115 
In Table 3, the race of the victim is not significant for the 
likelihood of receiving the death penalty from a jury; thus, the model 
fails to reject the null for Hypothesis #2.  There is no support for the 
notion that juries consider the race of the victim when choosing a 
capital sentence.  This finding is contrary to almost all recently-
published research, as illustrated in the literature review, which has 
indicated an overall race-of-victim effect related to capital punishment.  
Unlike juries in many jurisdictions previously studied by other 
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scholars, Tennessee juries do not seem to be influenced by the race of 
the victim in a capital case. 
Table 3: Model of Jury Decisions to Impose the Death Penalty in 
Tennessee, 1977-2007 (Binary Logistic Regression) 
 
Dependent Variable = Received Death Penalty (“1”) 
  
Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
Odds 
Ratio 
Victim Traits    
White Victim -.7401 .462 .477 
Female Victim -.1553 .324 .856 
Killing of Law Agent@ 3.379** 1.37 29.34 
Victim Stranger -.1284 .328 .880 
Elderly Victim -.0815 .407 .922 
Child Victim -.0202 .573 .980 
Defendant Traits    
Black Defendant -1.50*** .463 .223 
Male Defendant 1.733** .803 5.66 
Defendant Unemployed -.5787 .388 .561 
Previous Violent Felony 
Conviction 
2.728*** .363 15.31 
Potential for Rehabilitation -1.6927 1.43 .184 
Showed Remorse -.4499 .897 .638 
Learning Disability -1.3176 1.16 .268 
Crime Traits    
Urban County .4506 .328 1.57 
Three or More Victims .0636 .616 1.07 
Three or More Perpetrators -.3715 .497 .690 
Abnormal Method of Killing# .3129 .325 1.37 
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Dangerous Concurrent Crime^ .0770 .328 1.08 
Rape .6508 .516 1.92 
Evidence    
Co-Perpetrator Testimony 1.592*** .440 4.91 
Strong Witness ID 1.715*** .610 5.56 
Confession 1.032** .425 2.81 
Scientific Evidence 1.916*** .572 6.80 
CONSTANT -2.391 .953  
Total Number of Decisions 337   
Variance Inflation Factor 1.84   
Percent Correctly Classified 77.15%   
Percent Classified A Priori 52.6%   
LR Chi-Square 147.18***   
Pseudo R Square .318   
  
# = stabbing, throat-slashing, drowning, beating, strangle/suffocate, poisoning, 
burning, pushing off high building, or hitting with a vehicle 
@= victim was police officer, District Attorney, or judge  
^ = arson, robbery, burglary, kidnap, aircraft piracy, child abuse, or bombing 
 
*= p<.10; **= p<.05; ***= p<.01; two-tailed test 
 
This Article’s finding on this matter might be the product of 
including control variables that account for legal factors that many 
previous studies have neglected.  The focus on evidentiary concerns, 
such as scientific evidence, confessions, witness identification and 
corroborating witness testimony, may render racial differences related 
to jury application irrelevant.  Therefore, jurors could be acting to 
“correct” the mistakes of prosecutors who may be considering extra-
legal criteria in the application of capital punishment.  Specifically, all 
four of the “evidence variables” in Table 3 are statistically significant 
predictors of a jury’s decision to impose a death sentence (with three 
occurring at a probability level of less than .01, meaning that such 
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findings would occur at random less than one time out of 100).  In 
terms of the odds ratios demonstrated for these variables, co-
perpetrator testimony makes a jury’s death sentence 4.91 times more 
likely, strong witness identification makes it 5.56 times more likely, a 
confession makes it 2.81 times more likely, and scientific evidence 
makes it 6.8 times more likely.  
Other critical factors that increase the likelihood of receiving a 
death sentence from a jury—just as they increase likelihood of a 
prosecutor’s capital charge—include whether the victim is a police 
officer, judge or District Attorney (29.34 times more likely) and 
whether the defendant has a previous violent felony conviction (15.31 
times more likely).   
Table 3 does not indicate that the presence of any of the three 
mitigating factors reduces the likelihood of a death sentence—
although future research may wish to focus on a wider array of such 
variables.  The model does show, however, that male defendants are 
5.66 times more likely to receive the death penalty from a Tennessee 
jury than female defendants; perhaps jurors are less inclined to give 
female defendants a death sentence—even though prosecutors 
demonstrate no propensity to charge male defendants with capital 
offenses at a higher rate (Table 2).  Conversely, while prosecutors are 
more likely to impose capital charges when the victim is a female 
(Table 2), the gender of the victim is not a statistically significant 
predictor of jury behavior, as noted in Table 3.  Ultimately, unlike 
jurors, prosecutors may consider the political ramifications of failing 
to protect certain groups of victims.  Jurors, though, may be more 
empathetic to female defendants who are sitting before them.   
In addition, Table 3 also shows that the Defendant Unemployed 
variable is not a statistically significant predictor of a jury’s decision to 
impose a death sentence.  This provides some evidence that defendants 
who might lack the ability to afford private counsel will not 
necessarily be disadvantaged when it comes to the likelihood of 
receiving a capital sentence from a jury in the state of Tennessee.  
Moreover, this finding could indicate a positive development for those 
associated with the state’s public defender system, though future 
research should evaluate this matter more directly. 
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Finally, this Article observes that the defendant’s race actually 
is a significant predictor of a death sentence in Table 3, even with 
controlling for the numerous other variables, but the conclusion differs 
from what very early studies on the death penalty suggested.  Over the 
last three decades, Black defendants in Tennessee have actually been 
significantly less likely than White defendants to be sentenced to 
death.  This finding may stem from the fact that Whites are more likely 
to kill other Whites (see Table 1) and the fact that prosecutors are 
more likely to charge a capital offense when a victim is White (see 
Table 2).  Furthermore, prosecutors also might seek capital 
punishment in cases that they believe are more likely to result in a 
conviction—possibly cases that not only involve White victims but 
also incorporate some combination of factors that juries find especially 
relevant when imposing a death sentence.  Along these lines, future 
research should consider whether law enforcement officials may be 
more likely to expend resources to locate stronger forms of evidence, 
the types of evidence that Table 3 indicates are germane to jury 
decisions regarding capital punishment, when the victim falls into 
certain demographic categories. 
D. Additional Considerations 
Further assessing the impact of juries on the overall likelihood 
of receiving a death sentence in the state of Tennessee is Table A.1, 
which appears in Appendix B.  This model incorporates the full set of 
1006 cases addressed in Table 2 (the prosecutor model), but uses a 
dependent variable that is coded ‘1’ when a death sentence is the 
ultimate outcome.  As a result, Table A.1 predicts a result that stems 
from both prosecutorial and jury decision-making, and thus identifies 
the variables that are most important to the “system” in determining 
which persons receive capital punishment.  Most notable within this 
model is the conclusion that the race of the victim is not statistically 
significant for explaining the overall likelihood of a death sentence in 
Tennessee; consequently, juries may be “correcting” a problem 
emanating from prosecutors’ offices.  
Odds ratios for variables in the “overall” model also appear in 
Table A.1.  Results are similar to those for the other models, with two 
exceptions.  Those defendants with learning disabilities and those who 
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are unemployed are less likely to receive the death penalty than others.  
Accordingly, prosecutors and juries may collectively consider these 
matters as de-facto mitigating circumstances when it comes to the 
application of capital punishment. 
Lastly, the data also demonstrates that the Black defendant-
White victim scenario discussed earlier is not more likely to result in a 
death sentence than other defendant-victim combinations.  This Article 
examines this matter by replacing the race-of-defendant and race-of-
victim variables in the reported models with a dichotomous “Black 
defendant-White victim” variable, coded ‘1’ when this scenario 
presents itself and ‘0’ for all other combinations.  The “n” for this 
scenario is 124.  Adding the variable in either the prosecutor model 
(Table 2) or the jury model (Table 3) yields no evidence that Black 
defendant-White victim homicides are more likely to result in a death 
sentence in Tennessee.  There is also no significant effect after 
employing an interactive term that captures the simultaneous presence 
of White victims and Black defendants.  Therefore, regarding the 
overall imposition of capital punishment in Tennessee, race features 
most prominently in a prosecutor’s decision to levy a capital charge, 
an event that appears more likely to occur when the victim is White.116 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
The primary finding of this Article is that prosecutors in 
Tennessee are more likely to pursue capital charges against a 
defendant who kills a White victim.  Hindson et al. crystallize the 
repercussions of such a development by saying, “If the death penalty is 
supposed to help families of homicide victims, then, at best, it offers 
that ‘help’ far more often to families of White victims than to families 
of other homicide victims.”117  While that point certainly has 
ramifications for the justice system as a whole, this Article’s research 
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 Diagnostic statistical tests reported in all three of this Article’s tables demonstrate 
the respective strength of the models.  Specifically, chi-square values—which 
indicate the overall explanatory power of the models—are all statistically significant 
at less than a .01 probability level; and, “goodness-of-fit” tests indicate that the each 
model correctly classifies more cases than one would expect by chance.  In addition, 
the Variance Inflation Factor scores are all low enough to indicate that 
multicolinearity is not a problem, in spite of the numerous variables. 
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 Hindson et al., supra note 28, at 581. 
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examines the overall likelihood of receiving a death sentence and 
demonstrates that, in the state of Tennessee from 1977-2007, any race-
of-victim effect disappears.  In other words, when taking the jury’s 
decision into account, those who kill Whites are no more likely to 
receive a death sentence than those who kill non-Whites.  This 
conclusion falls in line with Phillips’ observation that “jurors could… 
strengthen, attenuate, or eliminate disparities that originate in the 
D.A.’s office.”118  Likewise, in the State of Tennessee, jurors appear to 
correct charging disparities that emanate from prosecutorial decisions 
to seek the death penalty.   
More specifically, the type of evidence available, rather than 
the race of a victim, seems to have a profound effect on the likelihood 
of a death sentence.  Hence, the results of this research actually 
produce confidence in the jury system, especially when prosecutors 
may have motives other than justice (e.g., political ones) influencing 
their decisions.  Buttressing this assertion is the observation that a 
prosecutor is more likely to seek a death sentence when a homicide 
victim is female (perhaps a perceived vulnerable group among 
constituents); however, the research also demonstrates that a victim’s 
gender does not affect juries that are deciding whether to impose a 
capital sentence.  Still, juries are less likely to impose a death sentence 
on female defendants.  This Article also shows that a defendant’s 
criminal history and whether a victim was a law enforcement official 
(defined as a police officer, District Attorney, or judge) are very strong 
predictors of both prosecutorial decisions to seek and jury decisions to 
impose capital punishment. 
Ultimately, because jury decisions are an important part of this 
Article’s analysis, future research should examine the manner in which 
juror race interacts with the other considerations discussed herein.  
Some limited empirical evidence exists from mock-trial experiments 
that a juror’s race might influence their perception of a defendant,119 
but assessments from real-world cases have been scant, and actual 
systematic research on juror-victim racial interaction does not yet 
exist. 
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 Phillips, supra note 48, at 834. 
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 See Samuel Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 171 (2007). 
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Although no data is available for the racial composition of the 
juries that rendered decisions affecting the research sample, this 
Article attempts to address this issue by generating a variable unused 
in previous literature.  Specifically, the “Batson variable” is 
dichotomous and is coded ‘1’ for all cases heard after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky,120 which declared that 
peremptory challenges during jury selection no longer could be based 
on a prospective juror’s race.   
Little research has examined empirically the impact of Batson 
in regard to capital punishment, and as Diamond et al. note, 
“Researchers who have examined the impact of Batson have looked 
only at cases in which Batson challenges have been mounted.”121  
Diamond et al. highlight a primary flaw with this limitation by 
suggesting that: “The most direct test of the effect of Batson would 
compare the racial make-up of juries in the years preceding and 
following Batson.  That is a test that has not yet been conducted.”122  
While no data exists to perform the specific test that Diamond et al. 
propose, adding a “Batson variable” to any of this Article’s models 
yields a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at less than 
a .05 probability level (and significance levels of other variables are 
not altered in any relevant way), indicating that both a prosecutor’s 
decision to pursue a capital charge and a jury’s decision to impose a 
death sentence in Tennessee have been less likely after the Batson 
decision. 
Beyond the broader inferences from this Article’s research, 
though, there is a litany of plausible alternative explanations that may 
account for changes in the death penalty’s application over time, as 
future research may further develop.  For example, shifts in public 
mood regarding capital punishment could provide an alternative 
explanation.  In the end, however, the racial demographics of all 
relevant figures related to the imposition of capital punishment—from 
defendants and victims to prosecutors and juries—have implications 
for the function of the justice system.     
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 In summary, for at least a segment of the justice system in the 
state of Tennessee from 1977 through 2007, the data lends itself to a 
sanguine pronouncement that although prosecutors were more likely to 
seek the death penalty when the victim of a death-eligible homicide 
was White, juries were not impacted by the race of the victim when it 
came to imposing a death sentence—even after controlling for an array 
of variables related to the victim, the defendant, the homicide itself, 
and the nature of available evidence.  This conclusion also reinforces 
the notion that race-of-defendant effects are not currently a cause for 
concern relating to capital punishment, as Black defendants in 
Tennessee were neither more likely to be charged with a capital crime 
by prosecutors nor more likely to be sentenced to death by a jury.   
Overall, though this Article focuses only on Tennessee, this 
work adds to a body of literature examining racial influences on 
prosecutorial discretion and jury decision-making in many 
jurisdictions.  Accordingly, this Article echoes the sentiments of 
Songer and Unah, whose research from South Carolina declares: 
“[w]hile we cannot claim that [our state] is representative of other 
states, we do claim that [our state] is not an outlier and that it exhibits 
political and legal characteristics found in most of the other thirty-
seven death penalty states.”123  Ultimately, the notion of equitable 
punishment for criminal offenses, especially when such punishment 
takes the life of a defendant, is worthy of detailed study.  This 
Article’s findings suggest that future research regarding capital 
punishment in this country should separate the prosecutorial decision 
to seek the death penalty from the jury decision to impose it, as 
different influences bear on each phase.  Finally, future research 
should also account for the evidence that juries consider while 
pondering the implementation of this nation’s severest criminal 
sentence.  The nature and quality of evidence, perhaps even more than 
the racial demographics of relevant parties, plays a critical role in the 
imposition of capital punishment in the state of Tennessee.     
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 Songer & Unah, supra note 4, at 164.  This Article also notes that, when it comes 
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Executions by State and Region Since 1976,” available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976 
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Appendix A: Summary of Statutory Aggravating Factors in 
Tennessee;  
Adapted from Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-204(i) 
 
1) Murder of a person less than 12 years of age when the defendant 
was at least 18 years of age; 
2) Defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies that 
involve the use of violence to persons;  
3) Defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more 
persons; other than the victim murdered;  
4) Defendant committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of 
remuneration;  
5) Murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture 
necessary to produce death;  
6) Murder was committed to prevent an arrest or prosecution of the 
defendant or another; 
7) Fleeing after first-degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, 
theft, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or 
discharging of a destructive device or bomb; 
8) Murder was committed while the defendant was in lawful custody 
or in a place of lawful confinement; 
9) Murder was committed against any law enforcement officer, 
corrections official, corrections employee, emergency medical or 
rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic, or 
firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official 
duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that 
such a victim was a person engaged in the performance of official 
duties;  
10) Murder was committed against judge, district attorney general or 
state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant 
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state attorney general due to or because of the exercise of the victims 
official duty or status and the 
defendant knew that the victim occupies said office;  
11) Murder was committed against an elected official, due to or 
because of the officials lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew 
that the victim was such an official; 
12) Defendant committed mass murder (three or more persons within 
the same episode or within a period of 48 months); 
13) Defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim after death;  
14) Victim was seventy (70) years of age or older; or victim of the 
murder was particularly vulnerable due to a significant handicap or 
significant disability (mental or physical), and at the time of the 
murder the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such 
handicap or disability; 
15) Murder was committed during the course of an act of terrorism.  
16) Murder of a pregnant woman where the killing was intentional and 
the perpetrator knew that the woman was pregnant. 
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Appendix B: 
Table A.1: Overall Likelihood of Receiving the Death Penalty in 
Tennessee, 1977-2007 (Binary Logistic Regression) 
Dependent Variable = Received Death Penalty (“1”) 
Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
Odds 
Ratio 
Victim Traits    
White Victim .2248 .349 1.25 
Female Victim .5411** .256 1.72 
Killing of Law Agent@ 4.148*** 1.121 63.30 
Victim Stranger .1365 .270 1.15 
Elderly Victim .7229** .351 2.06 
Victim Under 12 .5066 .477 1.66 
Defendant Traits    
Black Defendant -.8161** .337 .442 
Male Defendant .9618 .674 2.62 
Defendant Unemployed -.6153** .309 .541 
Previous Violent Felony 
Conviction 
3.3278*** .284 27.87 
Potential for Rehabilitation -1.2456 1.241 .288 
Showed Remorse -.1590 .676 .853 
Learning Disability -2.100* 1.252 .122 
Crime Traits    
Urban County .3298 .253 1.39 
Three or More Victims .4631 .562 1.59 
Three or More Perpetrators -.0346 .441 .966 
Abnormal Method of Killing# .0605 .260 1.06 
Dangerous Concurrent Crime^ .0053 .264 1.01 
Rape .9518** .426 2.59 
Evidence    
Co-Perpetrator Testimony 1.487*** .336 4.42 
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Strong Witness ID 1.236*** .427 3.44 
Confession 1.077*** .323 2.94 
Scientific Evidence 1.512*** .396 4.54 
CONSTANT -4.436 .785  
Total Cases 1006   
Variance Inflation Factor 1.84   
Percent Correctly Classified 89.96%   
Percent Classified A Priori 84.1%   
LR Chi-Square 316.07***   
Pseudo R Square .375   
 
# = stabbing, throat-slashing, drowning, beating, strangling/suffocating, poisoning, 
burning, pushing off high building, or hitting with a vehicle 
@= victim was police officer, District Attorney, or judge  
^ = arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, child abuse, or bombing 
 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed test 
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Appendix C: 
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Key Independent Variables 
Variable  Number Coded ‘1’ 
for Prosecutor Model 
(out of 1006 cases) 
Number Coded ‘1’ 
for Jury Model (out 
of 337 cases) 
Victim Traits  
 
White Victim 641 252 
Female Victim 392 171 
Victim Stranger 329 144 
Elderly Victim 105 60 
Victim Under 12 65 21 
Defendant Traits   
Black Defendant 480 135 
Male Defendant 993 341 
Defendant Unemployed 224 69 
Previous Violent Felony 
Conviction 
134 106 
Potential for Rehabilitation 10 5 
Showed Remorse 24 8 
Learning Disability 26 9 
Crime Traits   
Urban County 555 188 
Three or More Victims 30 22 
Three or More Perpetrators 90 41 
Abnormal Method of 
Killing 
398 157 
Killing of Law Agent 9 8 
Concurrent Dangerous 
Felony  
437 165 
Rape 52 36 
Evidence   
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Co-Perpetrator Testimony 97 44 
Strong Witness ID 48 20 
Confession 109 57 
Scientific Evidence 51 32 
 
